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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the arbitrator, by ruling on issues relating to 
Plat B and awarding damages based, at least in part, on work 
allegedly performed by Orton on Plat B, exceeded the authority 
granted to him by the parties' Agreement to Arbitrate. "Generally, 
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to find that an arbitrator has exceed his authority, a court must 
review the submission agreement and determine whether the 
arbitrator's award covers areas not contemplated by the submission 
agreement." Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 
P.2d 941, 949 (Utah 1996). The "authority of the arbitrator springs 
from the agreement to arbitrate." Id. (citing Swift Indus., Inc., v. 
Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972) and Western 
Elec. Co. v. Communications Wkrs. Of Am., 450 F.Supp. 876, 881 
(E.D.N.Y. 1978) ("The powers of an arbitrator are defined by 
agreement of the parties: the question they submit both establishes 
and limits the arbitrator's jurisdiction. It is the reviewing 
court's duty [under the exceeding authority test] to determine 
whether the arbitrator has acted within that jurisdiction.")); see 
also Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14 (c) . "The proper test under the 
exceeding authority ground is "'whether the arbitrator exceeded the 
powers delegated to him by the parties.'" Id. (citing Eljer Mfg., 
Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.2d 1250, 1256 (7th Cir. 1994)). The 
district court's determination that the arbitrator did not exceed his 
authority is a conclusion of law, which is granted no deference and 
reviewed for correctness. DeVore v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 884 P.2d 1246, 
1251 (Utah 1994); 
2. Whether the arbitrator, by ruling that Orton did not 
utilize too much material in the course of providing services on Plat 
C, manifestly disregarded well-established contract law concerning 
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the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As a judicially 
created doctrine, the manifest disregard of the law doctrine stems 
from the exceeding authority statutory ground. Buzas Baseball, Inc. 
v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996). "If 
arbitrators manifestly disregard the law in making their award, they 
can be said to have exceeded their authority." Id. The district 
court's determination that the arbitrator did not manifestly 
disregard the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a 
conclusion of law, which is reviewed for correctness. DeVore v. IHC 
Hosps., Inc., 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994); 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and 
regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out 
verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of 
the instant brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 20, 1995, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in Fourth 
District Court against Defendant alleging, causes of action for 
Wrongful Lien, Slander of Title, Defamation of Character. On May 7, 
1996, Defendant responded by filing his Answer, Counterclaim, and 
Third-Party Complaint. Thereafter, on May 17, 1996, Plaintiffs filed 
their Response to Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. 
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On June 9, 1997, Plaintiffs and Defendant, through their 
respective counsel of record, executed an Agreement to Arbitrate, in 
which the parties agreed that the arbitration would "focus" only on 
matters relating to Plat C. The arbitration was held on August 26-
27, and September 10, 1997, after which the arbitrator issued an 
Interim Arbitration Award. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration. Shortly thereafter, Defendant filed his Opposition 
to the Motion for Reconsideration. 
The arbitrator, on December 24, 1997, issued his Final 
Arbitration Award. On January 2, 1998, Defendant filed a Motion to 
Confirm Arbitrator's Award with the Fourth District Court, the 
Honorable Judge Steven L. Hansen presiding. Thereafter, on January 
22, 1998, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration 
Award together with a supporting Memorandum. 
On February 17, 1998, the district court held a hearing on the 
Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award, after which, it 
confirmed the arbitrator's Final Arbitration Award. On February 19, 
1998, the district court signed the Confirmation of Arbitrator's 
Award and Judgment, which was entered that same day. 
On March 23, 1998, Plaintiffs filed Notice of Appeal, thereby 
appealing to the Utah Supreme Court from the Confirmation of 
Arbitrator's Award and Judgment. Defendant, on or about June 8, 
1998, filed a Motion for Summary Disposition. Plaintiffs responded 
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by filing a Response in Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary 
Disposition. 
On July 15, 1998, the district court signed an Order Setting 
Aside Judgment Against Plaintiff Otto Belvedere. By way of Order 
signed on July 27, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court Meferred ruling on 
appellee's motion for summary disposition until further consideration 
. . . ." On August 7, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court poured-over the 
instant appeal to this Court for disposition. 
On October 30, 1998, Plaintiff Otto Belvedere filed a Stipulated 
Motion of Appellant Otto Belvedere to Voluntarily Dismiss Otto 
Belvedere From Appeal. Thereafter, on November 3, 1998, this Court, 
by way of Order Dismissing Appellant Otto Belvedere From Appeal, 
dismissed Otto Belvedere, solely, from the instant appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 20, 1995, Plaintiffs, Pacific Development, 
L.C. (Pacific), and Otto Belvedere, through counsel, filed a 
Complaint in Fourth District Court against Defendant, Eric Orton, 
d/b/a Eric Orton Excavation, alleging causes of action for Wrongful 
Lien, Slander of Title, Defamation of Character (R. 1-7, Complaint); 
2. On May 7, 1996, Defendant, through counsel, filed his 
Answer, Counterclaim, and Third-Party Complaint (R. 69-80, Answer, 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint); 
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3. On May 17, 1996, Plaintiffs, through counsel, filed their 
Response to Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint (R. 81-86, 
Response to Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint); 
4. On June 9, 1997, Plaintiffs and Defendant, through their 
respective counsel of record, executed an Agreement to Arbitrate, in 
which the parties agreed that the arbitration would "focus" only on 
matters relating to Plat C, inasmuch as all other matters had been 
resolved (R. 145, Agreement to Arbitrate, a true and correct copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit A to the Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs7 Motion to Vacate or Modify 
Arbitration Award; see also Finding of Fact); 
5. After the arbitration held on August 26-21, and September 
10, 1991, the arbitrator, on November 1, 1997, issued his Interim 
Arbitration Award (R. 187-92, Interim Arbitration Award). In that 
Interim Arbitration Award, the arbitrator, in direct contravention to 
the plain language of the parties' Arbitration Agreement, proceeded 
to rule on issues involving Plat B (See R. 187-92, Interim 
Arbitration Award); 
6. Thereafter, Plaintiffs' counsel filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration, objecting that the arbitrator lacked authority to 
rule on Plat B issues and requesting that the arbitrator reconsider 
its ruling in light of the well-established implied duty of good 
faith and fair dealing that Defendant breached in the course of using 
over three times the amount of fill material reasonably and fairly 
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necessary to complete Plat C (See R. 181-85, Motion for 
Reconsideration); 
7. Shortly thereafter, Defendant filed his Opposition to the 
Motion for Reconsideration (See R. 177-80, Opposition to Motion for 
Reconsideration); 
8. On December 24, 1997, the arbitrator issued his Final 
Arbitration Award, which states: 
Pacific's Motion for Reconsideration is denied. The 
Arbitrator heard the arguments during the course of 
the proceeding that are being reargued by Pacific. 
Pacific's argument is based largely upon its argument 
that Orton had within its scope of work the obligation 
to perform the rough grading of the roadway. The 
Arbitrator specifically found that the contract did 
not require that work to be done by Orton. Orton 
obviously has a duty of good faith and fair dealing 
with Pacific. The Arbitrator, however, further found 
that Pacific did not [sic] its burden of proof of its 
allegation that Orton wasted material in Plat C. 
(R. 138, Final Arbitration Award, ^25) . By way of the Final 
Arbitration Award, the arbitrator awarded a net amount to Defendant 
of $66,440.24, attorney fees in the amount of $17,500, and costs in 
the amount of $733.50 (Id. at R. 166-67, 1M23, 28-29); 
9. January 2, 1998, Defendant filed a Motion to Confirm 
Arbitrator's Award with the Fourth District Court, the Honorable 
Judge Steven L. Hansen presiding (R. 124-2 8, Motion to Confirm 
Arbitrator's Award); 
10. On January 22, 1998, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Vacate or 
Modify Arbitration Award together with a supporting Memorandum (R. 
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135-36, Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award; R. 137-56, 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award); 
11. On February 17, 1998, the district court held a hearing on 
the Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award, after which, 
without taking the matter under advisement and without making 
findings of fact, confirmed the arbitrator's Final Arbitration Award 
(See Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration 
Award, pp. 29-30) ; 
12. On February 19, 1998, the district court signed the 
Confirmation of Arbitrator's Award and Judgment, which was entered 
that same day (R. 230-33, Confirmation of Arbitrator's Award and 
Judgment); 
13. On March 23, 1998, Plaintiffs filed Notice of Appeal, 
thereby appealing to the Utah Supreme Court from the Confirmation of 
Arbitrator's Award and Judgment (R. 270-72, Notice of Appeal); 
14. On or about June 8, 1998, Defendant, through counsel, filed 
a Motion for Summary Disposition together with a supporting 
Memorandum. Plaintiffs responded by filing a Response in Opposition 
to Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition; 
15. On July 15, 1998, the district court signed an Order 
Setting Aside Judgment Against Plaintiff Otto Belvedere; 
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16. By way of Order signed on July 27, 1998, the Utah Supreme 
Court "deferred ruling on appellee's motion for summary disposition 
until further consideration . . . ."; 
17. On August 7, 1998, the Utah Supreme Court poured-over the 
instant appeal to this Court for disposition; 
18. On October 30, 1998, Plaintiff Otto Belvedere filed a 
Stipulated Motion of Appellant Otto Belvedere to Voluntarily Dismiss 
Otto Belvedere From Appeal; 
19. Thereafter, on November 3, 1998, this Court, by way of 
Order Dismissing Appellant Otto Belvedere From Appeal, dismissed Otto 
Belvedere, solely, from the instant appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The arbitrator, by ruling on issues relating to Plat B and 
awarding damages based, at least in part, on work allegedly performed 
by Orton on Plat B, exceeded the authority explicitly granted to him 
by the parties in their agreement to arbitrate. Notwithstanding the 
parties Agreement to Arbitrate, the arbitrator, throughout both the 
Interim and the Final Arbitration Award, ruled on matters outside of 
that granted to him by the parties by ruling on matters involving 
Plat B. By so doing, the arbitrator exceeded the authority 
explicitly granted to him by the parties in the Agreement to 
Arbitrate; 
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2. The arbitrator, by ruling that Orton did not utilize too 
much fill material in the course of providing services on Plat C, 
manifestly disregarded well-established contract law concerning the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In the course of so 
ruling, the arbitrator not only manifestly disregarded well-
established principles concerning the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, it unjustifiably added a new term to the unit 
contract entered into between the parties by requiring that Pacific 
hire and have an employee, i.e., an engineer, to monitor the amount 
of fill material utilized by Orton in the course of completing Plat 
C. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE ARBITRATOR, BY RULING ON ISSUES RELATING TO PLAT 
B AND AWARDING DAMAGES BASED, AT LEAST IN PART, ON 
WORK ALLEGEDLY PERFORMED BY ORTON ON PLAT B, EXCEEDED 
THE AUTHORITY EXPLICITLY GRANTED TO HIM BY THE PARTIES 
IN THEIR AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE. 
According to Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(c) and (d) , "a court may 
vacate an arbitration award if it appears that . . . the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers . . . or otherwise conducted the hearing to the 
substantial prejudice of the rights of a party . . . ." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-31a-15(l)(b) provides further that ua court shall modify or 
correct the award if it appears . . . the arbitrator's award is based 
on a matter not submitted to them . . . ." (Emphasis added). See 
also Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 
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949-50 (Utah 1996) (discussing the statutory ground of exceeding 
authority for setting aside arbitration award). 
"The proper test under the exceeding authority ground is 
"'whether the arbitrator exceeded the powers delegated to him by the 
parties.'" Id. (citing Eljer Manuf., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 
F.3d 1250, 1256 (7th Cir. 1994)). "'It is . . . fundamental that the 
authority of the arbitrator springs from the agreement to 
arbitrate.'" Id. (quoting Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 
466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972); Western Elec. Co. v. 
Communications Wkrs. of Am., 450 F.Supp. 876, 881 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) 
("The powers of the arbitrator are defined by agreement of the 
parties . . . It is the reviewing court's duty [under the exceeding 
authority test] to determine whether the arbitrator has acted within 
that jurisdiction.") (citations omitted). Thus, "while courts do not 
sit to determine whether the arbitrator has resolved a dispute as 
they would have, the court must determine whether an arbitrator has 
properly fulfilled his mandate." Western Elec. Co., 450 F. Supp. at 
881-82 (citations omitted). 
In the instant case, the parties, on June 9, 1997, executed the 
Agreement to Arbitrate (See R. 145, Agreement to Arbitrate, a true 
and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A) . The 
Agreement explicitly states, in relevant part, that "the arbitration 
will focus on the remaining issues of the dispute, those which relate 
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to Plat C, thereby resolving all remaining issues in the case." {Id.). 
Notwithstanding the parties Agreement, the arbitrator, 
throughout both the Interim and the Final Arbitration Award, ruled on 
matters outside of that granted to him by the parties by ruling on 
matters involving Plat B (See R. 187-92, Interim Arbitration Award; 
R. 137-43, Final Arbitration Award). By so doing, the arbitrator 
exceeded the authority explicitly granted to him by the parties in 
the Agreement to Arbitrate. 
II. THE ARBITRATOR, BY RULING THAT ORTON DID NOT UTILIZE 
TOO MUCH FILL MATERIAL IN THE COURSE OF PROVIDING 
SERVICES ON PLAT C, MANIFESTLY DISREGARDED WELL-
ESTABLISHED CONTRACT LAW CONCERNING THE IMPLIED 
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING. 
The manifest disregard of the law ground for overturning an 
arbitration award, as a judicially created doctrine, stems from the 
exceeding authority statutory ground. Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996) (citing Wilko v. 
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37, 74 S.Ct. 182, 187 (1953) ("[T]he 
interpretations of the law by the arbitrators [, ] in contrast to 
manifest disregard[t] are not subject . . . to judicial review for 
error . . . ." (emphasis added)); Amicizia Societa Navegazione v. 
Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 808 (2nd Cir 
1960) .2 "If arbitrators manifestly disregard the law in making their 
xIn Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941 
(Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court, although analyzing the manifest 
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award, they can be said to have exceeded their authority."2 Id. ; see 
also Eljer Manuf., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (stating that the arbitrator's decision will be set aside 
"if in reaching his result, the arbitrator deliberately disregards 
what he knows to be the law.") (citing Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. 
Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992); Jenkins v. Prudential-
Bache Sec. Inc., 847 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1988) (characterizing 
the "manifest disregard" standard as "willful inattentiveness to the 
governing law."); and Jeppson v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 879 
F.Supp. 1130, 1133 ((D. Utah 1995). According to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 (2nd Cir. 1986), 
Although the bounds of this ground have never been 
defined, it clearly means more than error or 
misunderstanding with respect to the law. Drayer v. 
Karsner, 572 F.2d 348, 352 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 
436 U.S. 948, 98 S.Ct. 2855 (1978); I/S Stavborg v. 
National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 432 (2d 
Cir. 1974) . The error must have been obvious and 
capable of being readily and instantly perceived by 
the average person qualified to serve as an 
arbitrator. Moreover, the term "disregard" implies 
disregard ground because it was raised by Buzas Baseball and relied 
upon by the trial court below, expressly reserved the issue of 
whether this ground is recognized in Utah inasmuch as the case was 
decided on other grounds. Id. at 951 n.8, 949. As a result, this 
issue is a matter of first impression. 
2The district court's determination that the arbitrator did not 
manifestly disregard the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is a conclusion of law, which this Court reviews for 
correctness. DeVore v. IHCHosps., Inc., 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 
1994) . 
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that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a 
clearly governing legal principle but decides to 
ignore or pay no attention to it. Bell Aerospace 
Company Division of Textron, Inc. v. Local 516, 3 56 
F.Supp. 354, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 1973, rev'd on other 
grounds, 500 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1974). 
Id. at 933. 
In this case, the arbitrator, in his Interim Arbitration Award, 
ruled as follows concerning the claim that Plaintiff is due a credit 
or offset for Orton utilizing too much fill material on Plat C: 
Pacific claims that it is entitled to a credit or 
offset to the claims of Orton alleging that Orton used 
too much imported material. The problem appears to be 
inherent to the unit price contract that was entered 
into by the parties. Unit price contracts have 
advantages and disadvantages. Pacific properly points 
out that under a unit price contract Orton has no 
incentive to be judicious in its use of material being 
paid for by the unit. On the other hand, Pacific only 
pays for what is actually used. Pacific, however, 
entered into the unit price type of contract. If 
Pacific wanted to exercise better control over the 
useage [sic] of material its [sic] should have had a 
representative (typically an engineer) on site to see 
that material was being properly used. During the 
performance of much of the work in Plat B Pacific had 
such a representative on site. During the performance 
of work on Plat C Pacific had no such representative 
on site. The Arbitrator does not find that the 
evidence supports a finding that Orton wasted 
material. There was evidence presented by Pacific 
that more material was used in Plat C than maybe 
Pacific thought should be used. Pacific, however, did 
not meet its burden of proof on that issue. The 
computations by Fred Clark were general in nature 
omitting some lengths of pipe installation, [sic] 
assumed that Orton was responsible to cut the road for 
rough grading, etc. 
(R. 187-88, Interim Arbitration Award, 1(22) . Upon receiving and 
reviewing the arbitrator's Interim Arbitration Award, Plaintiff 
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submitted a Motion for Reconsideration to the arbitrator, arguing 
that Orton breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing 
by utilizing over three times the amount of fill material reasonably 
required to complete Plat C (See R. 184, Motion for Reconsideration). 
In the course of so arguing, Plaintiff cited to various Utah cases 
setting forth and discussing Utah law on the implied duty of good 
faith and fair dealing (See id.). Notwithstanding, the arbitrator 
thereafter issued his Final Arbitration Award, which included the 
identical paragraph 22 as that previously set forth by the arbitrator 
in his proposed Interim Arbitration Award (R. 14 0, Final Arbitration 
Award, 1(22) . The arbitrator, however, included the following 
additional paragraph in its Final Arbitration Award concerning the 
issue as to Orton utilizing too much fill material: 
Pacific's Motion for Reconsideration is denied. The 
Arbitrator heard the arguments during the course of 
the proceeding that are being reargued by Pacific. 
Pacific's argument is based largely upon its argument 
that Orton had within its scope of work the obligation 
to perform the rough grading of the roadway. The 
Arbitrator specifically found that the contract did 
not require that work to be done by Orton. Orton 
obviously has a duty of good faith and fair dealing 
with Pacific. The Arbitrator, however, further found 
that Pacific did not [sic] its burden of proof of its 
allegation that Orton wasted material in Plat C. 
(See id. at R. 138, f25). 
By ruling in paragraph 22 of the Final Arbitration Award that 
the problem "appears to be inherent" in the unit price contract 
entered into by the parties, and that if "Pacific wanted to exercise 
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better control over the useage [sic] of the material its [sic] should 
have had a representative (typically an engineer) on site to see that 
material was being property used"/ the arbitrator manifestly 
disregarded the well-established contract principle, as extensively 
set forth in Utah case law, that each party to a contract has an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with the other party 
to the contract. See St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1994). By virtue of this covenant, 
"each party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or 
purposely do anything that will destroy or injure the other party's 
right to receive the fruits of the contract." Id. (citing Bastian v. 
Cedar Hills Investment & Land Co., 632 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah 1981); 
Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979)); see also Republic 
Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 
(citing St. Benedict's Dev., 811 P.2d at 199-200; Andalex Resources, 
Inc., 871 P.2d 1041, 1047-48 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). "A violation of 
the covenant gives rise to a claim for breach of contract." Id. The 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is especially applicable 
where, as in the instant case, one party under the contract grants 
the other party discretion to determine such terms as quantity, 
price, or time of performance. See, e.g., Cook v. Zions First 
National Bank, 919 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The arbitrator's 
deliberate disregard of the law concerning the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing is further demonstrated by his acknowledgment that 
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the parties entered into a unit price contract and his detailed 
discussion of the inherent "problems" with such contracts. In direct 
contravention to this acknowledgment and discussion, the arbitrator 
then ruled that "[i] f Pacific wanted to exercise better control over 
the useage [sic] of material its [sic] should have had a 
representative (typically an engineer) on site to see that material 
was being property used." By utilizing this as the basis for its 
ruling, the arbitrator not only manifestly disregarded the principles 
of law regarding the implied covenant of good faith and fair, but it 
implied a new term in the unit contract entered into by the parties 
by requiring that Pacific in fact hire an employee, i.e., an 
engineer, to monitor the fill material utilized by Orton in the 
course of completing Plat C. See Hal Taylor Assocs. v. 
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982) (holding that "this 
court will not rewrite a contract to supply terms which the parties 
omitted."). By requiring this, the arbitrator essentially relieved 
Orton of the duty to act in good faith and fairly with Pacific. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff, Pacific Development, L.C., 
respectfully asks that this Court reverse the district court's Order 
Confirming the Arbitrator's Award and remand the case for a 
determination and award of attorney fees incurred on appeal as well 
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as the entry of any orders or proceedings consistent with this 
Court's instructions set forth in its Opinion. 
STATEMENT REGARDING METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Counsel for Plaintiff / Appellant requests that the method of 
disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the 
Court uFor Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value 
in future cases due to the significant issues in the instant appeal 
dealing with arbitrator exceeding his or her authority as granted by 
the agreement by parties to arbitrate. Another reason for the 
opinion in the instant appeal should be by published opinion is that 
the issue involving the manifest disregard of well-established law is 
an issue of first impression under Utah case law. The aforementioned 
issues concern matters that are of continuing public interest and 
which, based on the facts of the instant appeal, involve issues 
requiring further development in the area of law dealing with the 
review of arbitration awards, which would benefit both the bar and 
public, respectively. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J3td day of November, 1998. 
ARNOLD &\WIGGINS, P.C, 
J^ioguns 
Attorneys^-fbr Appellant 
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AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE 
June?, 1997 
The parties to this Agreement hereby submit the following dispute to binding arbitration, 
with Robert F> Babcock to serve as the Arbitrator. The parties agree to submit to arbitration all 
remaining issues arising out of the dispute over a Mechanics' Lien filed against Riderwood 
Village, Plats B & C, the foreclosure of which is the subject of the Counterclaim in the case 
styled PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT, et al. v ORTON EXCAVATION, et al. and filed as Case 
No. 450500576 with the Fourth District Court in Provo, Utah. 
Part of the original Complaint concerning this matter was a Defamation Claim made by 
Otto Belvedere. The parties stipulate that said Defamation Claim will not be a subject of this 
arbitration since the Plaintiff has decided not to pursue it. Further, they acknowledge that the 
issues relating to the above-referenced Plat B of Riderwood Village have been resolved, and that, 
therefore, the arbitration will focus on the remaining issues of the dispute, those which relate to 
Plat C, thereby resolving all remaining issues in the case. 
July 11 * H, fc&chM<J 
The parties agree to arbitrate this matter on falyl ml My 2,1997 at the offices of / &r AUa. 12 $ 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, 57 West South Temple, 8* Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah. ^ V 
Tie parties agree that they will abide by the Award rendered by the Arbitrator and that a 
judgment may be entered upon the Award in a court of competent jurisdiction. 
The parties agree to compensate the Arbitrator at the hourly rate of $ 135/hour for time 
spent in the hearing and in deliberations. The parties each agree to deposit with the Arbitrator 
prior to the hearing the sum of One Thousand Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1,350.00). 
PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT/ 
By-fyiu/ r 
ORTON EXC 
Mark E. Arnold 
Attorney for Otto Belvedere and 
Pacific Development Orton Excavation 
rbt-pdon-utoapaLttNl 
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INTERIM ARBITRATION AWARD 
This matter came for hearing before the Arbitrator, Robert F. Babcock, on August 26 & 
27 and September 10,1997. The parties, Orton Excavation ("Orton") and Pacific Development 
("Pacific"), together with their respective in counsel, were present for each of the three days of 
the hearing. The parties presented evidence, both documentary and by testimony of witnesses. 
The parties made argument during the course of the proceeding and through briefs after the close 
of the evidence. The arbitrator has deliberated over the evidence and the briefs of counsel. 
Based upon the evidence the Arbitrator mnkes the following findings of fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Arbitrator initially admonishes the parties, as stated during the proceeding, that if 
they had communicated more clearly during the performance of the work many of the 
disagreements that are before the Arbitrator would likely have been resolved during the 
performance of the work. Confirming letters, memos, faxes, etc. about the scope of work, 
extras, pricing, etc. would have served both parties well. 
2. The contract between the parties provided for arbitration of the dispute. Further, the 
parties agreed to submit the matt,. :o arbitration for resolution. 
3. The parties entered into a contrae * c'ated April 10,1994. Pursuant to the contract, Orton 
was to perform certain work for Pacific on the Riderwood Village Subdivision in Utah 
County. The work was outlined in two attachments to the contract the first dated April 4, 
1994 and the second dated Octobe- 10,1994 which superceded the first The work was 
grouped under three headings Sewer, Water and Stonn Drain. The work was to be paid 
for according to various unit prices based upon actual quantities of work performed. 
Notably the October 10,1994 addendum stated "Quantities subject to on-site measuring 
and delivery invoices and/or trucking slips, after installation." 
4. Work was performed by Orton for Pacific on both Plat B and Plat C. 
5. It was stipulated that the sum of the extended unit price work amounted to the sum of 
$419,843.44. 
6. It was stipulated that Orton supplied bedding materials that amounted to $156,146.82. 
The figure was in the reconciliation of both parties. 
7. It was stipulated that an authorized representative of Pacific signed change orders for 
extra work performed by Orton on Plat B in the sum of $15,907.85. The Arbitrator notes 
that five of the thirteen approved extras in Plat B involved the stripping of material from 
roadways and the cutting of material in roadways. 
1 
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8. Orton asserted claims for additional extra work performed in Plat B. Item #15 was 
stipulated to in the sum of $977. 
9. Orton asserted claims for additional extra work performed in Plat C. Item #3 was 
stipulated to in the sum of $ 1320 by acknowledging that payment was made for this item. 
Item #6 in the sum of $1398.71 was similarly stipulated to. Item #12 was also stipulated 
to in the sum of $7560,00. The total of stipulated amounts is $10,278.71. 
10. Even though Pacific acknowledged that it "paid" for these items (outlined in paragraphs 
5,6 and 7), in its reconciliation Pacific failed to include the value of the agreed to items 
of $27,163.56 within the reconciliation. 
11. It was stipulated that the net sum of $567,934 (taking into account amounts paid back by 
Orton to Pacific) was paid by Pacific to Orton or to suppliers or subcontractors of Orton. 
In addition, two checks totaling $4,500 were produced for the first time at the hearing 
which were agreed had been paid by Pacific to Orton. The total stipulated net payments 
amounted to $572,433. 
12- Taking into account the above in ^ rationed stipulated items, the net due Orton by Pacific, 
before addressing the contested At£3uo IS $30,720.82. 
13. On the disputed extras in Plat E - .e arbitrator finds as follows: On item #3 the evidence 
supports the position of Orton in le sum of $990. On item #5 the evidence supports the 
position of Orton in the sum of S 2 4 i 2.50. On item #6 the evidence supports the position 
of Orton in the sum of $1409.44. On item #7 the evidence does not support the position 
of Orton. The contract does not have a differing site condition clause. The risk of 
differing subsurface conditions -v? * on Orton. On item #8 the evidence supports the 
position of Orton in the sum of 51031.31. On item #9 the evidence supports the position 
of Orton in the sum of $2580.50. On item #10 the evidence supports the position of 
Orton in the sum of $220. On iver.: #11 the evidence supports the position of Orton in the 
sum of $2627. On item #14 Ore- failed in its burden of proof. Orton is awarded the 
sum of $10,270.^5 on the dispuzt;; extras in Plat B. 
14. On the disputed extras in Plat C i e arbitrator finds as follows: On item #1 the evidence 
supports the position of Orton thai additional material was moved. The price seems high 
to the arbitrator. The sum of$60CC is awarded. On item #2 the evidence supports the 
position of Orton in the sum of Si 055.50. On item #4 the evidence supports the position 
of Orton in the sum of $1755. Cn item #5 the evidence supports the position of Orton in 
the sum of $112.83. On item #7 lie evidence partially supports the position of Orton but 
also that some of the problem w?^  caused by Orton's own errors in setting the boxes to 
the incorrect elevation. Orton i* awarded the sum of $1000. On item #10 the evidence 
supports the position of Pacific th~t Orton should not have expected that the storm sewer 
2 
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would not have been installed. The evidence supported the balance of Orton's claim in 
the sum of $6,440. On item #13 the evidence supports the position of Orton but only to 
the sum of $2000, Orton is awarded the sum of $16,362.83 on the disputed extras in Plat 
C. 
Of the payments made by Pacific to Mountainland, $9,922.50 were credited to finance 
charges and not for materials. Since payments were being made by Pacific, the failure to 
make timely payments was a risk borne by Pacific and not Orton. The sum of $9,922.50 
should not be charged against Orton. 
Orton asserted a claim for a credit for Mountainland invoices not chargeable to Orton that 
should be credited back. In its post hearing brief, Orton properly acknowledged that the 
evidence did not support the claim in general. The Arbitrator finds that since the items 
were billed to Orton on a regular basis, that Orton had the responsibility to review the 
bills on a timely basis and bring concerns about differences in pricing to Mountainland at 
that time and to Pacific before payments were made. The Arbitrator finds that Orton, 
however, did sustain its burden of proof on items 10 and 11 in the sum of $362.83. The 
Arbitrator also awards to Orton the cause of action, if any exists, against Mountainland to 
try to recover any inappropriate overcharges by Mountainland on the listed invoices. 
Orton asserted a claim for a credit for materials charged by Mountainland to Orton paid 
for by Pacific. Orton fails in its proof. The evidence was that Orton did the ordering of 
the materials, received the materials on site and had control of the materials at least until 
the time that Orton finished its w-ork. If materials were in fact left on site Orton should 
have made some type of inventor/ of the same and had it acknowledged by Pacific. 
Orton bears the risk of loss of material under the circumstances, 
Orton claims that it is entitled tc a credit for overcharges made by Westroc on materials 
delivered to the project The parties again should have been communicating about the 
invoices. Pacific should have been reviewing the invoices on a regular basis with Orton 
before making payment on the invoices. Orton should have been asking about what was 
being billed and charged against their contract The resulting situation is problematic. 
The Arbitrator awards to Orton the cause of action, if any exists, to pursue Westroc to 
recover any inappropriate overcharges by Westroc currently asserted to be in the range of 
$7,000. Orton knows what was quoted by Westroc, about the alleged substitution of 
materials by Westroc for its convenience, and now what was charged. Pacific is ordered 
to cooperate with Orton as necessary for Orton to pursue this claim against Westroc, if it 
so chooses. 
Orton claims that it is entitled to a loss of equity in its equipment due to the failure of 
Pacific to timely make payments for sums due. The loss of equity in equipment is clearly 
a consequential damage claim. The law allows for consequential damages only if they 
were reasonably foreseeable at ths time of entering into the contract. The damages are 
3 
19:21 FAX 801 5*1 7060 Walstadfc Babcock ©00 
not recoverable if they were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting but 
were later reasonably foreseeable at the time of the breach of the contract At the time of 
entering the contract Orton was only leasing the equipment During the performance of 
the contract, Orton exercised its option to purchase the equipment The claim of the loss 
of equity in purchased equipment was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of entering 
into the contract Orton is therefore not entitled to recover on this claim. The claim is 
further undermined by the unusually aggressive and unreasonable actions taken by the 
lender in repossessing and selling the equipment in a commercially unreasonable fashion. 
The claim is also undermined by Orton's failure to protect its position in bidding at the 
sale or otherwise mitigating its damages by seeking a stay of the sale or legally 
challenging the commercially reasonableness of the sale. 
Pacific is entitled to a deduction of $1200 for amounts paid to Gemini Concrete for 
making corrections to manholes that were set by Orton at an incorrect grade. 
Pacific claims that it is entitled to a credit or offset against the claims of Orton on the 
basis that Orton should have performed, as part of its contract, the work of rough grading 
of the roadways. The Arbitrator finds that Pacific foiled to meet the burden of proof on 
this issue. To the contrary, the evidence supports Orton's position that rough grading was 
not included in the contract between Pacific and Orton. The best evidence on this point 
was the fact that five signed cha^e orders on Plat B were to compensate Orton "as an 
extra" for stripping and grading work. The scope of the unit prices do not lend 
themselves to an interpretation that would indicate that grading work was included in any 
of the unit items. It would not be the norm in the industry to include rough grading in the 
unit items unless specifically indicated. While there was testimony to that effect from 
Pacific the Arbitrator cannot find that Pacific met its burden of proof. The Arbitrator 
notes that Pacific was not entirely consistent its position as to payment for cutting the 
roadways to rough grade. On the one hand, Pacific wanted the cutting of the roadways to 
be ancillary to the stated unit pries items of work and not to be paid separately. On the 
other hand, Pacific indicated thai Orton was to be paid $1.50/yd for the cutting of the 
material. Pacific is not entitled to an offset for payments to Camesecca or Christensen for 
rough grading work since that work was not part of the Pacific - Orton contract. 
Pacific claims that it is entitled to a credit or offset to the claims of Orton alleging that 
Orton used too much imported material. The problem appears to be inherent to the unit 
price contract that was entered into by the parties. Unit price contracts have advantages 
and disadvantages. Pacific properly points out that under a unit price contract Orton has 
no incentive to be judicious in its use of material being paid for by the unit On the other 
hand, Pacific only pays for what is actually used. Pacific, however, entered into the unit 
price type of contract. If Pacific wanted to exercise better control over the useage of 
material its should have had a representative (typically an engineer) on site to see that 
material was being properly used. During the perfoimance of much of the work in Plat B 
Pacific had such a representative on site. During the performance of work on Plat C 
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Pacific had no such representative on site. The^hitrator does not fcd'fliarthc^evidence 
supports a finding that Orton wasted material. There was evidence presented by Pacific 
thatmore material was used in Plat C than maybe Pacific thought should have been used. 
Pacific, however, did not meet its burden of proof on that issue. The computations by 
Fred Clark were general in nature omitting some lengths of pipe installation, assumed 
that Orton was responsible to cut the road for rough grading, etc. 
The award is summarized as follows: 
Extended unit price work 
Bedding materials 
Signed change orders on Plat B 
Stipulated extra work in Plat B 
Award on disputed extra work in Plat B 
Stipulated extra work in Plat C 
Award on disputed extra work in ?Iat C 
Total of Work Performed by Orton 
Credits: 
Payments to Orton 
Credit for repairs to manho < ss by Gemini 
Total credits due Pacific 
Other Adjustments: 
Add back finance charges paid to Mountainland 
Add back for materials used on Pacific residences 
$419,843.44 
$156,146.82 
$15,907.85 
$977.00 
$10,270.75 
$10,278.71 
$16,363.33 
$629,787.90 
($572,432.99) 
($1,200.00) 
($573,632.99) 
$9,922.50 
$362.83 
Net amount due Orton $66,440.24 
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23. Orton is entitled to interest on the unpaid amounts at the statutory rate often percent per 
annum. The sole reference to 24% interest is found on one change order signed by the 
representative of Pacific. That single invoice is insufficient to justify an award of interest 
higher than the statutory rate often percent per annum on all of the claims. Interest shall 
accrue as of May 15,1995 and shall run until the award is paid. 
24. Orton is the prevailing party in this arbitration. Orton prevailed, but obviously not 
entirely. Orton's counsel is requested to submit an affidavit of attorneys fees and costs 
within ten days of the date of this Interim Award. Pacific shall have ten days to file an 
objection to the request for attorneys fees. Orton shall have five days to file a response to 
the objections filed by Pacific. The arbitrator will then issue a Final Award resolving the 
issue of attorneys and costs. 
Dated this 7th day of November, 1997 
<?JL<UAJL 
Robert F. Babcock, Arbitrator 
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FINAL ARBITRATION AWARD 
This matter came for hearing before the Arbitrator, Robert F. Babcock, on August 26 & 
27 and September 10, 1997. The parties, Orton Excavation ("Orton") and Pacific Development 
("Pacific"), together with their respective in counsel, were present for each of the three days of 
the hearing. The parties presented evidence, both documentary and by testimony of witnesses. 
The parties made argument during the course of the proceeding and through briefs after the close 
of the evidence. The arbitrator deliberated over the evidence and the briefs of counsel. Based 
upon the evidence the Arbitrator made the following findings of fact in his Interim Arbitration 
Award: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Arbitrator initially admonishes the parties, as stated during the proceeding, that if 
they had communicated more clearly during the performance of the work many of the 
disagreements that are before the Arbitrator would likely have been resolved during the 
performance of the work. Confirming letters, memos, faxes, etc. about the scope of work, 
extras, pricing, etc. would have served both parties well. 
2. The contract between the parties provided for arbitration of the dispute. Further, the 
parties agreed to submit the matter to arbitration for resolution. 
3. The parties entered into a contract dated April 10,1994. Pursuant to the contract, Orton 
was to perform certain work for Pacific on the Riderwood Village Subdivision in Utah 
County. The work was outlined in two attachments to the contract the first dated April 4, 
1994 and the second dated October 10,1994 which superceded the first. The work was 
grouped under three headings Sewer, Water and Storm Drain. The work was to be paid 
for according to various unit prices based upon actual quantities of work performed. 
Notably the October 10,1994 addendum stated "Quantities subject to on-site measuring 
and delivery invoices and/or trucking slips, after installation." 
4. Work was performed by Orton for Pacific on both Plat B and Plat C. 
5. It was stipulated that the sum of the extended unit price work amounted to the sum of 
$419,843.44. 
6. It was stipulated that Orton supplied bedding materials that amounted to $ 156,146.82. 
The figure was in the reconciliation of both parties. 
7. It was stipulated that an authorized representative of Pacific signed change orders for 
extra work performed by Orton on Plat B in the sum of $15,907.85. The Arbitrator notes 
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that five of the thirteen approved extras in Plat B involved the stripping of material from 
roadways and the cutting of material in roadways, 
Orton asserted claims for additional extra work performed in Plat B. Item #25 was 
stipulated to in the sum of $977. 
Orton asserted claims for additional extra work performed in Plat C. Item #3 was 
stipulated to in the sum of $1320 by acknowledging that payment was made for this item. 
Item #6 in the sum of $1398.71 was similarly stipulated to. Item #12 was also stipulated 
to in the sum of $7560.00. The total of stipulated amounts is $10,278.71. 
Even though Pacific acknowledged that it "paid" for these items (outlined in paragraphs 
5, 6 and 7), in its reconciliation Pacific failed to include the value of the agreed to items 
of $27,163.56 within the reconciliation. 
It was stipulated that the net sum of $567,934 (taking into account amounts paid back by 
Orton to Pacific) was paid by Pacific to Orton or to suppliers or subcontractors of Orton. 
In addition, two checks totaling $4,500 were produced for the first time at the hearing 
which were agreed had been paid by Pacific to Orton. The total stipulated net payments 
amounted to $572,433. 
Taking into account the above mentioned stipulated items, the net due Orton by Pacific, 
before addressing the contested items is $30,720.82. 
On the disputed extras in Plat B the arbitrator finds as follows: On item #3 the evidence 
supports the position of Orton in the sum of $990. On item #5 the evidence supports the 
position of Orton in the sum of $1412.50. On item #6 the evidence supports the position 
of Orton in the sum of $1409.44. On item #7 the evidence does not support the position 
of Orton. The contract does not have a differing site condition clause. The risk of 
differing subsurface conditions was on Orton. On item #8 the evidence supports the 
position of Orton in the sum of $ 1031.31. On item #9 the evidence supports the position 
of Orton in the sum of $2580.50. On item #10 the evidence supports the position of 
Orton in the sum of $220. On item #11 the evidence supports the position of Orton in the 
sum of $2627. On item #14 Orton failed in its burden of proof. Orton is awarded the 
sum of $10,270.15 on the disputed extras in Plat B. 
On the disputed extras in PJat C the arbitrator finds as follows: On item #1 the evidence 
supports the position of Orton that additional material was moved. The price seems high 
to the arbitrator. The sum of $6000 is awarded. On item #2 the evidence supports the 
position of Orton in the sum of $1055.50. On item #4 the evidence supports the position 
of Orton in the sum of $ 1755. On item #5 the evidence supports the position of Orton in 
the sum of $112.83. On item #7 the evidence partially supports the position of Orton but 
also that some of the problem was caused by Orton's own errors in setting the boxes to 
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the incorrect elevation. Orton is awarded the sum of $1000. On item #10 the evidence 
supports the position of Pacific that Orton should not have expected that the storm sewer 
would not have been installed. The evidence supported the balance of Ortonfs claim in 
the sum of $6,440. On item #13 the evidence supports the position of Orton but only to 
the sum of $2000. Orton is awarded the sum of $16,362.83 on the disputed extras in Plat 
C. 
Of the payments made by Pacific to Mountainland, $9,922.50 were credited to finance 
charges and not for materials. Since payments were being made by Pacific, the failure to 
make timely payments was a risk borne by Pacific and not Orton. The sum of $9,922.50 
should not be charged against Orton. 
Orton asserted a claim for a credit for Mountainland invoices not chargeable to Orton that 
should be credited back. In its post hearing brief, Orton properly acknowledged that the 
evidence did not support the claim in general. The Arbitrator finds that since the items 
were billed to Orton on a regular basis, that Orton had the responsibility to review the 
bills on a timely basis and bring concerns about differences in pricing to Mountainland at 
that time and to Pacific before payments were made. The Arbitrator finds that Orton, 
however, did sustain its burden of proof on items 10 and 11 in the sum of $362.83. The 
Arbitrator also awards to Orton the cause of action, if any exists, against Mountainland to 
try to recover any inappropriate overcharges by Mountainland on the listed invoices. 
Orton asserted a claim for a credit for materials charged by Mountainland to Orton paid 
for by Pacific. Orton fails in its proof. The evidence was that Orton did the ordering of 
the materials, received the materials on site and had control of the materials at least until 
the time that Orton finished its work. If materials were in fact left on site Orton should 
have made some type of inventory of the same and had it acknowledged by Pacific. 
Orton bears the risk of loss of material under the circumstances. 
Orton claims that it is entitled to a credit for overcharges made by Westroc on materials 
delivered to the project. The parties again should have been communicating about the 
invoices. Pacific should have been reviewing the invoices on a regular basis with Orton 
before making payment on the invoices. Orton should have been asking about what was 
being billed and charged against their contract. The resulting situation is problematic. 
The Arbitrator awards to Orton the cause of action, if any exists, to pursue Westroc to 
recover any inappropriate overcharges by Westroc currently asserted to be in the range of 
$7,000. Orton knows what was quoted by Westroc, about the alleged substitution of 
materials by Westroc for its convenience, and now what was charged. Pacific is ordered 
to cooperate with Orton as necessary for Orton to pursue this claim against Westroc, if it 
so chooses. 
Orton claims that it is entitled to a loss of equity in its equipment due to the failure of 
Pacific to timely make payments for sums due. The loss of equity in equipment is clearly 
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a consequential damage claim. The law allows for consequential damages only if they 
were reasonably foreseeable at the time of entering into the contract. The damages are 
not recoverable if they were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of contracting but 
were later reasonably foreseeable at the time of the breach of the contract. At the time of 
entering the contract Orton was only leasing the equipment. During the performance of 
the contract, Orton exercised its option to purchase the equipment. The claim of the loss 
of equity in purchased equipment was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of entering 
into the contract. Orton is therefore not entitled to recover on this claim. The claim is 
further undermined by the unusually aggressive and unreasonable actions taken by the 
lender in repossessing and selling the equipment in a commercially unreasonable fashion. 
The claim is also undermined by Orton's failure to protect its position in bidding at the 
sale or otherwise mitigating its damages by seeking a stay of the sale or legally 
challenging the commercially reasonableness of the sale. 
Pacific is entitled to a deduction of $1200 for amounts paid to Gemini Concrete for 
making corrections to manholes that were set by Orton at an incorrect grade. 
Pacific claims that it is entitled to a credit or offset against the claims of Orton on the 
basis that Orton should have performed, as part of its contract, the work of rough grading 
of the roadways. The Arbitrator finds that Pacific failed to meet the burden of proof on 
this issue. To the contrary, the evidence supports Ortonfs position that rough grading was 
not included in the contract between Pacific and Orton. The best evidence on this point 
was the fact that five signed change orders on Plat B were to compensate Orton "as an 
extra" for stripping and grading work. The scope of the unit prices do not lend 
themselves to an interpretation that would indicate that grading work was included in any 
of the unit items. It would not be the norm in the industry to include rough grading in the 
unit items unless specifically indicated. While there was testimony to that effect from 
Pacific the Arbitrator cannot find that Pacific met its burden of proof. The Arbitrator 
notes that Pacific was not entirely consistent its position as to payment for cutting the 
roadways to rough grade. On the one hand, Pacific wanted the cutting of the roadways to 
be ancillary to the stated unit price items of work and not to be paid separately. On the 
other hand, Pacific indicated that Orton was to be paid $1.50/yd for the cutting of the 
material. Pacific is not entitled to an offset for payments to Camesecca or Christensen for 
rough grading work since that work was not part of the Pacific - Orton contract. 
Pacific claims that it is entitled to a credit or offset to the claims of Orton alleging that 
Orton used too much imported material. The problem appears to be inherent to the unit 
price contract that was entered into by the parties. Unit price contracts have advantages 
and disadvantages. Pacific properly points out that under a unit price contract Orton has 
no incentive to be judicious in its use of material being paid for by the unit. On the other 
hand, Pacific only pays for what is actually used. Pacific, however, entered into the unit 
price type of contract. If Pacific wanted to exercise better control over the useage of 
material its should have had a representative (typically an engineer) on site to see that 
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material was being properly used. During the performance of much of the work in Plat B 
Pacific had such a representative on site. During the performance of work on Plat C 
Pacific had no such representative on site. The Arbitrator does not find that the evidence 
supports a finding that Orton wasted material. There was evidence presented by Pacific 
that more material was used in Plat C than maybe Pacific thought should have been used. 
Pacific, however, did not meet its burden of proof on that issue. The computations by 
Fred Clark were general in nature omitting some lengths of pipe installation, assumed 
that Orton was responsible to cut the road for rough grading, etc. 
The award is summarized as follows: 
Extended unit price work $419,843.44 
Bedding materials $156,146.82 
Signed change orders on Plat B $ 15,907.85 
Stipulated extra work in Plat B $977.00 
Award on disputed extra work in Plat B $ 10,270.75 
Stipulated extra work in Plat C $ 10,278.71 
Award on disputed extra work in Plat C $ 16,363.33 
Total of Work Performed by Orton $629,787.90 
Credits: 
Payments to Orton ($572,432.99) 
Credit for repairs to manholes by Gemini ($ 1,200.00) 
Total credits due Pacific ($573,632.99) 
Other Adjustments: 
Add back finance charges paid to Mountainland $9,922.50 
Add back for materials used on Pacific residences $362.83 
Net amount due Orton $66,440.24 
01 
23. Orton is entitled to interest on the unpaid amounts at the statutory rate often percent per 
annum. The sole reference to 24% interest is found on one change order signed by the 
representative of Pacific. That single invoice is insufficient to justify an award of interest 
higher than the statutory rate often percent per annum on all of the claims. Interest shall 
accrue as of May 15,1995 and shall run until the award is paid. 
24. Orton is the prevailing party in this arbitration. Orton prevailed, but obviously not 
entirely. Orton's counsel is requested to submit an affidavit of attorneys fees and costs 
within ten days of the date of this Interim Award. Pacific shall have ten days to file an 
objection to the request for attorneys fees. Orton shall have five days to file a response to 
the objections filed by Pacific. The arbitrator will then issue a Final Award resolving the 
issue of attorneys and costs. 
The Interim Arbitration Award was issued dated November 7,1997. Subsequent to the 
issuance of the Interim Arbitration Award, Orton submitted an affidavit of attorneys fees dated 
November 12,1997 and a letter dated December 10,1997 with further argument about the 
attorneys fee issue. Pacific submitted an Objection to the Award of Attorneys Fees and a Motion 
for Reconsideration both dated December 22,1997. Orton filed an Opposition to Motion for 
Reconsideration and a Supplemental Affidavit of Attorneys Fees both dated December 23,1997. 
After due consideration of the Motion for Reconsideration and the Objection to Award of 
Attorneys Fees and the materials filed by each of the parties, the Arbitrator makes these 
additional rulings: 
25. Pacific's Motion for Reconsideration is denied. The Arbitrator heard the arguments 
during the course of the proceeding that are being reargued by Pacific. Pacific's argument 
is based largely upon its argument that Orton had within its scope of work the obligation 
to perform the rough grading of the roadway. The Arbitrator specifically found that the 
contract did not require that work to be done by Orton. Orton obviously has a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing with Pacific. The Arbitrator, however, further found that 
Pacific did not its burden of proof of its allegation that Orton wasted material in Plat C. 
26. Pacific's contention that the Arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine issues as 
to Plat B is rejected. Pacific is correct in stating that the arbitration agreement signed on 
or about June 9,1997 represented that the issues relating to Plat B had been resolved that 
the remaining issues to be resolved at the arbitration related to Plat C. In actuality, the 
parties had not in fact reached an agreement on the Plat B issues. Pacific's assertion in its 
Motion for Reconsideration that the issues on Plat B had been resolved and were not to 
be part of the arbitration is not supported by the evidence and material provided to the 
Arbitrator during the course of the Arbitration. In fact, Pacific submitted its Pre-
Arbitration Statement to the Arbitrator dated August 25,1997 which included as the first 
document in Exhibit "C" a document entitled "Pacific's Development's Amended 
Responses to Claims Concerning Plat B". During the course of the proceeding each of 
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the parties presented evidence on the disputes relating to Plat B. The Parties clearly 
submitted those issues to the Arbitrator for resolution. The Award as it relates to Plat B 
is not modified. The Arbitrator also finds that the subcontract agreement required all 
disputes to be resolved by arbitration which is what the parties have now done. 
The Arbitrator rules that the subcontract (consistent with UCA 78-27-56.5) provides for 
an award of attorneys fees to Orton. Pacific breached the subcontract agreement by 
failing to pay Orton for work performed for Pacific. Further, that as to the mechanics lien 
on Plat C the applicable statute (UCA 38-1-18) supports an award of attorneys fees on 
Plat C as well. 
Orton contends that it is entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee for approximately 
158 hours for Mr. Bradford at a premium rate of $225/hour rather than the initial billing 
rate of $125/hour charged by Mr. Bradford. The Arbitrator rejects the claim for a 
premium rate adjustment. The Arbitrator finds that the rate of $125/hour is a reasonable 
rate. It is the same rate charged by Mr. Young for a total of approximately 36 hours. The 
total attorneys at issue amount to $24,200. As the Arbitrator previously found in the 
Interim Award, Orton did not prevail on all of its claims and issues asserted during the 
arbitration. After taking into account the success achieved, the complexity of the matter, 
and other factors as outlined in Dixie Bank the Arbitrator awards the sum of $17,500 in 
attorneys fees to Orton. 
Orton incurred costs in the sum of $733.25. No exception was taken to any costs by 
Pacific. The Arbitrator awards the sum of $733.25 in costs incurred to Orton. The 
Subcontract agreement indicates that the parties are to bear the costs of their chosen 
arbitrator. Each party incurred fees to the arbitrator of $2700. The Arbitrator rules that 
each party is to bear their respective share of the arbitrator fees which are not to be taxed 
as a "cost." 
Dated this 24th day of December, 1997 
Robert F. Babcock, Arbitrator 
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Addendum D 
Richard D. Bradford (0421) 
BRADFORD, BRADY & JOHNSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
389 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
(801) 374-6272 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT, L.C., 
a Limited Liability Company, and 
OTTO BELVEDERE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ERIC ORTON dba ORTON EXCAVATION, 
Defendant. 
CONFIRMATION OF 
ARBITRATOR'S AWARD 
AND 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 950400576 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Robert Babcock, Arbitrator 
Upon Motion of the Defendants, the Court confirms the award made by Arbitrator Robert 
Babcock. The Court denies the Plaintiffs' Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award. The 
Court hereby enters judgment against the Plaintiffs, jointly and severally, as follows: 
Principal $66,440.24 
Pre-Judgment Interest at 10% per Annum $18,384.83 
to 2/18/98 
Attorney's Fees $20,980.00 
Costs $ 733.50 
TOTAL JUDGMENT $106,538.57 
MICROFILMED. 
= ILED til 
4TH DISTRICT CG'JRi 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
FEB 19 9 w W) '98 
File No. 0794.04 
CONFIRMATION OF ARBITRATOR'S AWARD AND JUDGMENT 
Pagel 
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Together with interest on the entire judgment, and together with after-accruing attorneys 
fees as may be shown by affidavit. 
DATED this / f day of February, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE of SERVICE 
On this I -j day of February, 1998, a copy of the Confirmation of Arbitrator's Award 
and Judgment was sent by facsimile transmission to: 
Mark E. Arnold 
HOLMGREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C. 
American Plaza II, Suite 404 
57 West 200 South ^ 
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